Why the 2025 Amendments to EO 14144 Walked Back Progress on PQC, SBOMs, and Enforcement, Even as the Products to Support Them Have Become Real.
The June 2025 amendments to Executive Order 14144 read like a cybersecurity manifesto. They name adversaries (China, Russia, Iran, North Korea) with unprecedented directness and reference cutting-edge threats like quantum computing and AI-enabled attacks. The rhetoric is strong. The tone, urgent.
But beneath the geopolitical theater, something quieter and more troubling has happened. The Executive Order has systematically stripped out the enforcement mechanisms that made federal cybersecurity modernization possible. Mandates have become “guidance.” Deadlines have turned into discretion. Requirements have transformed into recommendations.
We’re witnessing a shift from actionable federal cybersecurity policy to a fragmented, voluntary approach, just as other nations double down on binding standards and enforcement.
The Enforcement Rollback
The most visible casualty was the software bill of materials (SBOM) mandate . The original EO 14144 required vendors to submit machine-readable attestations, with specific deadlines for updating federal procurement rules. These requirements have been entirely deleted.
This removal actually makes sense. Most SBOMs today are fundamentally broken: generated manually, and don’t actually match to deployed artifacts. Without robust validation infrastructure, SBOMs create more noise than signal. Use cases like vulnerability correlation break down when the underlying data is untrustworthy.
Once you have reproducible builds and verifiable provenance pipelines, SBOMs become implicit in the process. The government was both premature and naive in requiring SBOMs before the ecosystem could reliably generate them and do something with them. More fundamentally, they hooed that mandating documentation would somehow solve the underlying supply chain visibility problem – unfortunately thats not the case.
But SBOMs are a symptom of deeper issues: unreproducible builds, opaque dependency management, and post-hoc artifact tracking. Simply requiring vendors to produce better paperwork was never going to address these foundational challenges. The mandate confused the deliverable with the capability.
What’s more concerning is what else disappeared. Provisions mandating phishing-resistant multi-factor authentication, real-time interagency threat sharing, and specific timelines for aligning federal IT procurement with Zero Trust requirements all vanished. The detailed Border Gateway Protocol security language was replaced with generic “agency coordination” directives. The EO stripped away near-term pressure on vendors and agencies alike.
Yet even as these enforcement mechanisms were being removed, the amendments introduced something potentially transformative.
Rules as Code: Promise, Paradox, and Perfect Timing
The most exciting addition is buried in bureaucratic language. A pilot program for “machine-readable versions of policy and guidance” in cybersecurity appears almost as an afterthought. While the EO doesn’t name OSCAL explicitly, this is almost certainly referring to expanding the Open Security Controls Assessment Language use beyond its current FedRAMP usage into broader policy areas.
This could be transformative. Imagine cybersecurity policies that are automatically testable, compliance that’s continuously verifiable, and security controls that integrate directly with infrastructure-as-code. OSCAL has already proven this works in FedRAMP: structured security plans, automated assessment results, and machine-readable control catalogs. Expanding this approach could revolutionize how government manages cybersecurity risk.
But there’s something deliciously ironic about the timing. We’re finally standardizing JSON schemas for control matrices and policy frameworks just as AI becomes sophisticated enough to parse and understand unstructured policy documents directly. It’s almost comical. Decades of manual compliance work have driven us to create machine-readable standards, and now we have “magical AI” that could theoretically read the original messy documents.
Yet the structured approach remains the right direction. While AI can parse natural language policies, it introduces interpretation variations. Different models might understand the same requirement slightly differently. OSCAL’s structured format eliminates ambiguity. When a control is defined in JSON, there’s no room for misinterpretation about implementation requirements.
More importantly, having machine-readable controls means compliance tools, security scanners, and infrastructure-as-code pipelines can directly consume and act on requirements without any parsing layer. The automation becomes more reliable and faster than AI interpretation. Real-time compliance monitoring really only works with structured data. AI might tell you what a policy says, but OSCAL helps you build systems that automatically check if you’re meeting it continuously.
This pattern of promising technical advancement while retreating from enforcement continues in the amendments’ approach to cryptographic modernization.
The Post-Quantum Reality Check
Then there’s the post-quantum cryptography provisions. The EO requires CISA and NSA to publish lists of PQC-supporting products by December 2025, and mandates TLS 1.3 by January 2030.
The TLS 1.3 requirement appears to be carried over from the previous executive order, suggesting this wasn’t a deliberate policy decision but administrative continuity. The amendment specifically states that agencies must “support, as soon as practicable, but not later than January 2, 2030, Transport Layer Security protocol version 1.3 or a successor version.” More tellingly, the 2030 timeline likely reflects a sobering recognition of enforcement reality: federal agencies and contractors are struggling with basic infrastructure modernization, making even a five-year runway for TLS 1.3 adoption potentially optimistic.
This reveals the central tension in federal cybersecurity policy. The infrastructure is calcified. Legacy systems, interception-dependent security architectures, and procurement cycles that move at geological speed all contribute to the problem. A 2030 TLS 1.3 mandate isn’t visionary; it’s an acknowledgment that the federal government can’t move faster than its most outdated components.
But this enforcement realism makes the broader PQC timeline even more concerning. If we need five years to achieve TLS 1.3 adoption across federal systems, how long will the actual post-quantum migration take? By 2030, the question won’t be whether agencies support TLS 1.3, but whether they’ve successfully migrated key exchange, digital signatures, and PKI infrastructure to post-quantum algorithms. That’s a far more complex undertaking.
In essence, the EO treats PQC like a checklist item when it’s actually a teardown and rebuild of our cryptographic foundation. Historically, the federal government has led cryptographic transitions by creating market demand and demonstrating feasibility, not by setting distant mandates. When the government moved to AES or adopted Suite B algorithms, it drove adoption through procurement pressure and early implementation.
Meanwhile, allies like the UK and Germany are taking this traditional approach with PQC. The UK’s National Cyber Security Centre has published detailed migration timelines and will launch a pilot program to certify consultancy firms that provide PQC migration support to organizations. Germany’s Federal Office for Information Security has been leading in co-developing standards and demonstrating early government adoption. They’re creating market pull through demonstrated feasibility, not regulatory deadlines that may prove unenforceable.
Beyond cryptography, the EO does introduce some concrete requirements, though these represent a mixed bag of genuine progress and missed opportunities.
The EO also tasks NIST with updating key frameworks and calls for AI-specific vulnerability coordination. All valuable work. But notably absent: any requirement for agencies to adopt, implement, or report on these updated frameworks.
One genuinely new addition is the IoT Cyber Trust Mark requirement: by January 2027, federal agencies must require vendors of consumer IoT products to carry the labeling. This represents concrete procurement leverage, though it’s limited to a narrow product category.
These mixed signals, technical infrastructure development alongside enforcement retreat, reflect a broader pattern that undermines the federal government’s cybersecurity leadership.
As we’ve explored in previous discussions of AI’s impact on compliance, this shift toward automated policy interpretation and enforcement represents a broader transformation in how expertise flows through complex systems, but only when the underlying mandates exist to make that automation meaningful.
We’re building this sophisticated machine-readable infrastructure just as the enforcement mechanisms that would make it meaningful are being stripped away. It’s like having a perfectly engineered sports car but removing the requirement to actually drive anywhere.
The Infrastructure Is Ready. The Mandate Isn’t.
Federal cybersecurity policy shapes vendor behavior, influences state and local government standards, and signals U.S. priorities to international partners. Without centralized mandates, vendors receive mixed signals. Agencies implement inconsistently. Meanwhile, international partners advance with clearer timelines and stronger enforcement. The U.S. risks ceding leadership in areas where it built the foundational standards, just as adversaries accelerate their own capabilities.
The United States has built remarkable cybersecurity infrastructure. OSCAL for automated compliance, frameworks for secure software development, and draft PQC standards for cryptographic transition all represent genuine achievements. But the June 2025 amendments represent a retreat from the leadership needed to activate this infrastructure.
We have the tooling, standards, and momentum, but we’ve paused at the moment we needed to press forward. In the face of growing threats and global urgency, discretion is not resilience.
We’ve codified trust, but stopped requiring it, leaving security to agency discretion instead of institutional design. That’s not a strategy. It’s a hope. And hope is not a security control.